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OIL & GAS LAW
INTRODUCTION
Conflicts over oil and gas interests continually arise in situations
involving ownership of coalbed methane, royalty payments on settlement
proceeds, and tortious interference with oil and gas leases. The Tenth
Circuit addressed these conflicts during the survey period.' Part I summa-
rizes the historical background and legislation surrounding oil and gas
law. Part II addresses ownership of coalbed methane within the context
of the multi-hundred million dollar case Southern Ute Indian Tribe v.
Amoco Production Co.2 Part III discusses the payment of royalties on
settlement proceeds in Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell3 and Watts v. At-
lantic Richfield Co.' Part IV examines issues involving tortious interfer-
ence with oil leases in Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc.' and Watts v. Atlan-
tic Richfield Co.'
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
As the natural gas industry boomed in the 1920s, inconsistent state
regulations created interstate transportation problems.! In a series of
opinions, the United States Supreme Court prohibited the states from
regulating interstate gas transportation In 1938, Congress responded
with the enactment of the Natural Gas Act (NGA). 9 The NGA delegated
1. The survey period covered cases decided between September 1996 and August 1997. The
Tenth Circuit addressed some oil and gas law issues not discussed in this survey. First National Oil,
Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 102 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 1996), addressed "spin
down" authorizations. The Tenth Circuit addressed two other royalty-related issues. Tulsa Energy,
Inc. v. KPL Production, Co., 111 F.3d 88 (10th Cir. 1997), discussed the payment of interest accrued
on royalties. James Barlow Family Ltd. Partnership v. David M. Munson, Inc., 124 F.3d 1321 (10th
Cir. 1997), involved royalty payments on settlement proceeds based on the interpretation of complex
mineral leases.
2. 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997).
3. 98 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996).
4. 115 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 1997).
5. 94F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996).
6. 115 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 1997).
7. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, 10 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 53, 53 (1995) ("State regulation of interstate transportation of gas created
intolerable problems ...").
8. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that the dormant commerce clause of the United States
Constitution prohibited such state action. See Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co.,
273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927); Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1924); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 599-600 (1923).
9. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1994). The Act applies to the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of
natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, indus-
trial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or
sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local
distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the produc-
tion or gathering of natural gas.
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to the Federal Power Commission the authority to set "just and reason-
able" rates for the interstate resale of natural gas by pipelines and pro-
ducers.'
Severe gas shortages due to industry regulation in the 1970s spurred
Congress to enact the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)." Under
the NGPA, Congress established the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission, giving it the authority to determine price ceilings based on gas
price characteristics and the cost of locating and producing gas supplies.'2
In response to the new opportunity to purchase gas, pipelines committed
to large take-or-pay clauses in supply contracts. 3 This contractual re-
structuring between natural gas producers and purchasers created new
legal problems involving royalty obligations and take-or-pay contract
provisions."
This chronology set the stage for judicial resolution of royalty dis-
putes. In addition, new problems arose with the ownership of coalbed
methane and tort-based claims.
II. OWNERSHIP OF COALBED METHANE
A. Background
Coalbed methane (CBM) has sparked recent interest and problems.'5
CBM results from the coalification process whereby the carbonaceous
matter of plants initially decays to form peat.'6 Subsequently, thousands
of years of elevated pressure and temperature metamorphose the peat
Id. § 717(b).
10. Id. § 717c.
11. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., State Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally De-
regulated Market: The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 15, 19 (1987)
[hereinafter Pierce, State Regulation]; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., National Gas Regulation,
Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 72 (1981) ("[A] call for deregulation followed the
publication of evidence linking regulation to shortages in the interstate gas market [in the 1970s].").
The NGPA functioned as a complicated compromise between gas pipeline operators and gas pro-
ducers which sought to gradually phase in natural gas deregulation over the following several dec-
ades. See id. at 85-86.
12. Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural
Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 348 (1983).
13. Pierce, State Regulation, supra note 11, at 19.
14. John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223, 226 (1996).
15. See Harry Cohen, Developing and Producing Coalbed Gas: Ownership, Regulation, and
Environmental Concerns, 2 PACE ENvrL. L. REV. I, 1-3 (1984). See generally Nancy P. Regelin,
Coalbed Gas Ownership in Pennsylvania-A Tenuous First Step with U.S. Steel v. Hoge, 23 DuQ.
L. REV. 735, 735 (1985) (commenting that the question of ownership of coalbed gas has only re-
cently arisen). CBM is also known as "firedamp," "coalbed gas," or "coal seam gas." Jeff L. Lewin,
Coalbed Methane: Recent Court Decisions Leave Ownership "Up in the Air," but New Federal and
State Legislation Should Facilitate Production, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 631, 632 (1994).
16. Jeff L. Lewin et al., Unlocking the Fire: A Proposal for Judicial or Legislative Determi-
nation of the Ownership of Coalbed Methane, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 563,572 (1992).
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into coal and methane." This methane, called CBM, is found within the
micropores of coal.'8
Coal mining releases CBM in two steps. First, CBM detaches from
micropores and flows into larger macropores."9 Second, the gas travels
from the macropores through a series of fractures into the mine face.'
Although most CBM stays within the coal seam, some CBM leaks into
the coal strata." Regular mining practices create fractures or fissures in
the coal seam, which allows CBM to migrate to areas of relatively low
pressure.' The CBM collects in these areas, creating the potential for
explosions." Obviously, this susceptibility to explosions is a substantial
hazard for miners." Deadly explosions caused by CBM occur each year.'
In the past, miners extracted CBM from the coal mine prior to mining in
order to avoid this danger.6 Today, federal law requires ventilation of
mining areas."
For most of the century, the coal mining industry only thought of
CBM as a hazard and a nuisance." Even though miners have been suc-
17. Id.
18. Stacy L. Leeds, Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Company: Judicial
Construction of Coalbed Methane Gas Ownership, 17 ENERGY L.J. 489, 490 (1996). Technically,
methane is located within coal because
biochemical and bacterial transformation [occurs] during the peat state of coal deposi-
tion and subsequently by metamorphic processes as buried peat increases in rank to
become coal. Because of the fine pore structure of coal and degraded peat, sorptive
capacities of such substance are very large so that much of the methane evolved during
coalification is held in the peat and in the coal.
Cohen, supra note 15, at 4. CBM and natural gas are compositionally similar, but not identical.
While methane is the primary component of each gas, CBM and natural gas can be distinguished due
to the presence of other chemical compounds within these two gases. Lewin et al., supra note 16, at
572.
19. Lewin et al., supra note 16, at 573.
20. Id.; Leeds, supra note 18, at 490.
21. Lee Davidson, Comment, Oil and Gas Law: Ownership of Coalbed Methane Gas, 33
WASHBURN L.J. 911,913 (1994). The coal seam is the "porous layer where solid rock is located."
Leeds, supra note 18, at 490 n. 10. The coal seam contains millions of tiny pores in which the coal is
found. Davidson, supra, at 913 n.33.
22. Leeds, supra note 18, at 490.
23. Davidson, supra note 21, at 914.
24. See Lewin, supra note 15, at 632.
25. Regelin, supra note 15, at 748-49.
26. Cohen, supra note 15, at 2.
27. Davidson, supra note 21, at 914. "All coal mines shall be ventilated by mechanical venti-
lation equipment installed and operated in a manner approved by an authorized representative of the
Secretary and such equipment shall be examined daily and a record shall be kept of such examina-
tion." 30 U.S.C. § 863(a) (1994). Additionally, Alabama requires that:
Main fans ventilating mines shall be operated continuously, except when the mine is shut
down with all power underground cut off and with all men out of the mine. When the fan
is started again, the mine shall be examined for gas and other hazards by certified persons
and declared safe before underground power may be restored and men other than the ex-
aminers permitted to enter the mine.
ALA. CODE § 25-9-80(i) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1997); cf. Regelin, supra note 15, at 750 (arguing
that ventilation practices waste a valuable energy resource).
28. See Lewin et al., supra note 16, at 567.
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cessfully extracting marketable CBM since the 1930s and 1940s, the
demand for CBM was historically low since alternative sources of oil
and gas were plentiful and inexpensive.' After the energy crisis of the
1970s, however, the energy industry began to consider CBM a valuable
and productive resource:"
Several factors served as catalysts for increased CBM production:
technological advancements enhanced CBM as a viable energy source;'
federal tax credits given for CBM production increased interest in the
resource; 2 and environmental concerns during the 1980s turned more
attention to CBM. 3 These 'catalysts forced advancements in CBM ex-
traction technology4 and increased CBM production to the point that it
now constitutes approximately six percent of the United States' viable
gas reserves.3
As CBM production became viable, mineral owners began disputing
the legal issue of CBM ownership.' Problems exist when there is "a di-
versity of subsurface ownership rights, with one party holding title to the
coalbed and another party holding property interest in other subsurface
resources such as oil and gas. ..
29. Id.
30. Id. The energy crisis stimulated interest in CBM as an alternative energy resource. David-
son, supra note 21, at 914.
31. See Davidson, supra note 21, at 914 (suggesting that technological advancements spurred
CBM exploration and production). Geological advancement also aided CBM development. Donald
F. Santa & Patricia J. Beneke, Federal Natural Gas Policy and the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 14
ENERGY L.J. 1,44 (1993).
32. Davidson, supra note 21, at 914-15; see Santa & Beneke, supra note 31, at 45. CBM
qualifies for the nonconventional fuels tax credit under section 29 of the Internal Revenue Code.
I.R.C. § 29 (1996). Although the statute does not expressly refer to CBM, the definition of a gaseous
product in the coal strata includes CBM. Leeds, supra note 18, at 489 n.3.
33. See Lewin et al., supra note 16, at 583-87.
34. Davidson, supra note 21, at 914-15; see also Lewin et al., supra note 16, at 691 n.l 1
(listing various conferences held discussing CBM technology). West Virginia has recently welcomed
a plan to build a $200 million power plant fueled by CBM. Governor Announces Power Plant Plan,
(last modified Nov. 18, 1997) <http://www.state.wv.us/govemor/Presstpower.html>.
35. Leeds, supra note 18, at 489. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, the nation's
coalbeds may contain as much as 850 trillion cubic feet of available methane. Regelin, supra note
15, at 737.
36. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 3; Leeds, supra note 18, at 490. Most oil and gas leases do
not provide for ownership of CBM. Santa & Beneke, supra note 31, at 45. Most states lack legal
guidance on the issue. Id. Some leases do contain CBM ownership provisions; however, leases are
usually a standard form oil and gas lease which cannot easily be manipulated to include a CBM
ownership provision. See Harry Cohen, Leasing of Coalbed Methane Gas Rights----Are Oil and Gas
Lease Clauses Analogous?, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 703, 721-222 (1985). Lawyers are advised to draft
CBM leases on an individual basis and to not use standard form oil and gas leases. Id. at 722.
37. Leeds, supra note 18, at 490. "A person who holds the undivided 'fee simple title' to the
surface and to all coal, gas and other mineral rights in a property underlain with gas-bearing coal
strata undoubtedly has title to the CBM." Lewin, supra note 15, at 636. The ownership problem
usually arises when the mineral interests are transferred and the coal rights are severed from the gas
rights. Id.
In 1981, the Department of the Interior attempted to resolve the
ownership issue and accelerate CBM development. 8 The Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Interior
detailing his legal opinion on the ownership issue. 9 The letter was subse-
quently promulgated as a Solicitor's Opinion. '
The Solicitor concluded that the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910
did not include CBM in the coal reservation and that the rights to CBM
passed to the surface owner when the patent was first issued."' In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Solicitor found several factors to be relevant.
First, the Solicitor examined the physical characteristics of coal and
CBM and found that CBM is separate and distinct from coal because it is
a gas and potentially severable from coal. 2 Second, the Solicitor ob-
served that CBM was considered to be a hazardous nuisance as evi-
denced in the legislative history of the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and
1910." Next, the Solicitor emphasized that the Uraniferous Lignite Act"
expressly stated which minerals were subject to a reservation in the
United States."5 Finally, he supported his conclusion by relying on case
law based on common law principles that a coal reservation does not
include CBM. '
Some courts have also addressed the CBM ownership issue, relying
on the physical properties of CBM and coal to resolve it."7 The first case
concerning CBM ownership, United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge," held
that ownership of CBM vested in the owner of the coal. '9 The Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court emphasized the physical characteristics of the CBM
38. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816,829 (10th Cir. 1997).
39. Id.
40. Id. The letter was promulgated without notice or comment. Id.
41. Ownership of and Right to Extract Coalbed Gas in Federal Coal Deposits, 88 Interior Dec.
538, 538 (1981).
42. Id. at 540.
43. Id. at 541. "When coal was reserved by the United States under the 1909 and 1910 Acts,
coalbed gas was viewed not as a valuable resource, but as a nuisance, and an acknowledgement of its
hazardous qualities is found in the legislative history of the Act of June 22, 1910." Id. The Solicitor
relied on the colloquy of Congressmen Stephens and Mondell to determine that the legislative intent
of the Acts limited coal ownership to coal, not CBM. Id. at 542.
44. 69 Stat. 679 (1955) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 541-541i (1994)).
45. Id. at 542-43.
46. Id. at 544. However, the Solicitor admitted that the case was not controlling on the issue of
federal lands. Id.
47. See NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So. 2d 212 (Ala. 1993) (holding that a
gas interest reservation includes CBM when the CBM migrates outside the coalbed); Vines v.
McKenzie Methane Corp., 619 So. 2d 1305, 1309 (Ala. 1993) (holding that CBM ownership accom-
panies coal ownership); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983) (holding that the
coalbed owner also owns the CBM).
48. 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).
49. U.S. Steel, 468 A.2d at 1383.
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by specifying that the coal owner owns the CBM if it is still located
within the coal seam."
B. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co.
5
1. Facts
Between 1874 and 1880, the entire Southern Ute Indian Reservation
ceded to the United States due to the discovery of mineral resources on
the land.52 The land was then opened up to homesteading and mineral
exploration. 3 In 1906, President Roosevelt withdrew 64 million acres
from homesteading to promote federal government interests in coal.' To
counteract the homesteading problems, Congress enacted the Coal Lands
Acts of 1909P and 1910' which allowed homesteaders to obtain patents
for land subject only to a reservation of coal. In 1934, Congress passed
the Indian Reorganization Act,' which restored the tribal lands back to
the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, including equitable title to the coal, sub-
ject to outstanding homestead patents.'
In recent decades, Amoco, the owner of oil and gas leases on the
reservation lands, explored and extracted CBM from coal owned by the
Southern Ute Indian Tribe (Tribe).' However, the Tribe claimed owner-
ship of the CBM since it held legal title to the coal.' As owner of the
coal, the Tribe sued, alleging that Amoco trespassed on tribal lands and
coal, failed to pay a severance tax to the Tribe, and deprived the Tribe of
rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Tribe sought remedies in-
cluding a declaratory judgment giving the Tribe CBM ownership and
50. Id.
51. 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997).
52. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 824.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 825.
55. 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1994). The relevant portion of the Act states:
(Any person... may... upon making satisfactory proof of compliance with the laws
under which such lands are claimed, receive a patent therefore, which shall contain a res-
ervation to the United States of all coal in said lands, and the right to prospect for, mine,
and remove the same.
Id.
56. 30 U.S.C. § 85 (1994). The relevant portion of the Act states:
[Ulpon satisfactory proof of full compliance with the provisions of the laws under which
entry is made, and of sections 83 to 85 of this title, the entryman shall be entitled to a pat-
ent to the land entered by him, which patent shall contain a reservation to the United
States of all the coal in the lands so patented, together with the right to prospect for, mine,
and remove the same.
Id.
57. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 825.
58. 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
59. Id. However, the land was actually returned to the Indians in 1938. Id.
60. Id. at 819.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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requiring tribal consent for CBM extraction.' In addition, the Tribe
sought an order quieting title to the CBM, injunctive relief to halt CBM
extraction, damages for injuries to coal, title to all exploration and pro-
duction facilities on tribal lands, and costs and attorney's fees.' The
Tribe also sued several federal defendants for breach of fiduciary duty as
trustees for the Tribe.'
The district court held that CBM ownership rested with Amoco and
granted summary judgment for the federal defendants on the breach of
fiduciary duty claim.' The court did not address the Tribe's other claims
since it found that Amoco owned the CBM. ' The Tribe appealed."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the Tribe
owned the CBM 9 The court identified the issue upon appeal as whether
the Tribe, as owner of the coal, also owned the CBM.' ° The court first
turned to the acts of 1909 and 1910 to determine whether Congress in-
tended to include or exclude CBM from the statutory reservation of
coal." The court found no specific congressional intent to include CBM
as part of coal because the plain meaning of the statutes did not define
coal nor indicate a congressional intent to include CBM as part of coal. 2
CBM could not economically or efficiently be extracted from coal in
1909, and therefore, Congress was unaware of the CBM's value. 3 The
court did find, however, that Congress had a broad general intent to re-
serve all coal with present and future economic value to the United
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The federal defendants included the Secretary of the Interior and the Department of the
Interior's subordinate agencies. Id.
66. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1161 (D. Colo. 1995).
67. Id.
68. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 820.
69. Id. at 836.
70. Id. at 820.
71. Id. at 821.
72. Id. at 824. Amoco argued that Congress's use of the word "coal" specifically referred only
to solid coal. Answer Brief for Amoco at 15, Southern Ute Indian Tribe (No. 94-1579).
73. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 823 n. 11. In 1909, coal degasification was possible
but it required the extraction and destruction of the coal to obtain the coalbed methane gas. Id. In
contrast, CBM drilling "for the first time allows CBM to be released from coal without bringing
large volumes of coal to the surface. The technique is typically employed where the coal... cannot
economically be mined." Id.
1998] OIL & GAS 1037
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States." Congress realized that "full economic realization of that benefit
would require advances in technology.""
Amoco argued that the 1981 Solicitor's Opinion, which construed
the meaning of coal within the Acts of 1909 and 1910 to exclude CBM,
was controlling and should be given great deference. 6 The court, how-
ever, considered the Solicitor's Opinion to be arbitrary." Accordingly,
the court found that the general congressional intent behind the statutes
governed this issue.78 Therefore, the court held that coal ownership in-
cluded CBM, which rested with the Tribe. 9 The Tenth Circuit reversed
the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings on the remaining issues.' °
Amoco petitioned the Tenth Circuit for a rehearing en banc.8'
Amoco alleged that the three-judge panel failed to consider the meaning
of "coal" and analyzed CBM in situ rather than at the wellhead.'2 Amoco
claimed that the Tenth Circuit also ignored historic treatment of mineral
reservations and erroneously refused to consider how CBM is treated
under the Mineral Leasing Act."
The Tribe contended that established statutory canons of construc-
tion required the court to resolve any ambiguities in favor of the govern-
ment since the acts do not expressly convey CBM."' The Tribe also ar-
gued that since the only way to mine CBM in 1909 was through coal
mining, "Congress would not have granted CBM to agricultural entry-
74. Id. at 826. The court followed the Tribe's argument that Congress adopted a "broader
view" that accounted for future technological advancements that would expand CBM uses. Brief of
Southern Ute Indian Tribe at 33, Southern Ute Indian Tribe (No. 94-1579). Amoco argued that
Congress chose a very narrow interpretation of coal. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 825.
75. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 828. "Courts have consistently construed mineral
reservations in favor of the United States." Id.
76. Id. at 829. The opinion was entitled Ownership of and Right to Extract Coalbed Gas in
Federal Coal Deposits, 88 Interior Dec. 538 (1981). Id.
77. Id. at 835-36. "An agency decision which is not reasoned persuades no more than it con-
trols." Id. at 835.
78. Id. at 836.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Amoco's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Southern Ute
Indian Tribe (No. 94-1579).
82. Id. at 3. In situ means "not at the surface." Id. at 9. Amoco argued that since Congress
used the word "coal" instead of "gas" in the acts, Congress intended "coal" to mean solid rock. Id. at
4.
83. Id. at 11, 15-16. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1994)). The Mineral Leasing Act construed with the acts of 1909 and 1910
would have, according to Amoco, compelled the court to consider "coal" to be solid rock. Id. at 15-
16.
84. Tribe's Supplemental Brief Rehearing En Banc at 7, Southern Ute Indian Tribe (No. 94-
1579).
men . ". ..", Moreover, since the 1909 and 1910 acts reserved "all the
coal in the lands," Congress expressly retained ownership of all undis-
covered coal.'
. The Tenth Circuit granted Amoco's petition for a rehearing en banc,
hearing oral arguments on March 17, 1998. The court reheard only the
issue of whether "coal" included CBM under the acts of 1909 and 1910.7
3. Postscript: Rehearing En Banc
The Tenth Circuit, in its opinion issued on July 20, 1998, affirmed its
decision granting the Tribe ownership of the CBM. 8 The court empha-
sized again that "ambiguity or uncertainty in the terms employed [in land
grants] should be resolved in favor of the government." " The court re-
stated, almost verbatim, its analysis of the plain meaning of the statutes
and general congressional intent.'
The court expanded its previous analysis of specific congressional
intent by emphasizing that on the face of the statutes, the coal was re-
served for subsequent mining and removal. 9' The court concluded that
the existence of alternative dictionary definitions created an ambiguity in
the statutes.' In response to the dissent and Amoco's reliance on the fact
that Congress created split mineral estates on public lands by the 1909
Act, the court relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's seminal deci-
sion in United States Steel v. Hoge," which held that the CBM contained
within coal belonged to the owner of the coal estate, rather than the natu-
ral gas owner.' Therefore, Congress lacked the specific intent to exclude
CBM from its reservations of coal.
85. Id. at 15. The only way to extract CBM was through coal mining. Id. The right to mine
also included the right to vent CBM. Id. at 16. Therefore, CBM ownership vested with coal owner-
ship. Id.
86. Id. at 28. The common dictionaries and encyclopedias of the early 1900s indicate that coal
contained gaseous components now called CBM. Id. at 29.
87. Order, Southern Ute Indian Tribe (No. 94-1579) (order granting rehearing en banc). The
court declined to rehear argument concerning the Solicitor's Opinion.
88. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 94-1759, 1998 WL 404549 (10th Cir.
July 20, 1998).
89. Id. (quoting Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 234 U.S. 669, 680 (1914)).
90. Id. at *4, *10-14.
91. Id. at *5.
92. Id. at *5-6. The court stated that
Amoco and the dissent focus solely on the word "coal" and totally ignore what is appar-
ent from the face of the statutes: the coal was reserved from patents issued to land claim-
ants under the land grants of "non-mineral" lands to homesteaders; the lands had been
"classified, claimed, or reported as being valuable for coal;" and the reservation of coal
included "the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same."
Id.
93. 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).
94. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 1998 WL 404549, at *8-9.
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C. Analysis
The analysis of both the Tenth Circuit and district court centered on
the definitions of coal and CBM.9' However, the Tenth Circuit arrived at
the opposite conclusion than the district court while using similar refer-
ences, such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, and legislative history.' The
district court felt that the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 were unam-
biguous because Congress only intended to reserve solid rock coal exclu-
sive of the CBM retained within the coal. 97 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the exclusion of the words "coalbed methane" from the
acts created an ambiguity in the statutes because no evidence existed that
Congress intended the gas owners to also own CBM, an inherent con-
stituent of coal." The existence of alternative definitions of coal and
CBM also created an ambiguity in the statutes.'
The Tenth Circuit continued the analysis by applying the canon of
statutory construction that "ambiguity or uncertainty in the terms em-
ployed [in land grants] should be reserved in favor of the government.""
The Tenth Circuit's decision hinged on its interpretation of coal and the
legislative history indicating that Congress reserved all constituents of
coal, including CBM, when it reserved "all the coal" to the United States
with an eye toward the future economic value of CBM and advance-
ments in extraction technology.' °1
The Tenth Circuit's decision that a coal reservation includes CBM
is not unusual. The Tenth Circuit followed other jurisdictions resolving
the CBM ownership issue in favor of the coal owner by focusing on the
physical characteristics of CBM and coal.'" In its analysis of specific
95. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816, 822-23 (10th Cir.
1997); Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1153 (D. Colo. 1995).
96. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 822-23; cf. Southern Lte Indian Tribe, 874 F.
Supp. at 1153 (deciding that the Congress intended the coal to mean "solid rock fuel").
97. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 874 F. Supp. at 1153.
98. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 822. "[CBM] is not sufficiently like other natural
gases for us to conclude that Congress unambiguously intended the owners of other natural gases to
also own CBM associated with the reserved coal." Id.
99. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 1998 WL 404549, at *5-6.
100. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 821 (quoting Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R., 234
U.S. 669, 680 (1914)).
101. Id. at 826. The court stated:
Rather than indicating a limited reservation of coal to the United States, the legislative
history suggests that Congress adopted an interpretation of coal which encompassed
both the present and future economic value of coal, including value that could only be
realized through advances in technology such as those which drive the present day ex-
ploration for CBM.
Id.
102. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 1998 WL 404549, at *9; see NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank, N.A. v.
West, 631 So. 2d 212, 221 (Ala. 1993) (holding that the coal owner owns CBM contained in coal but
the gas owner owns migrated CBM); Vines v. McKenzie Methane Corp., 619 So. 2d 1305, 1309
(Ala. 1993) (finding that coal ownership extends to CBM); United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468
A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983) (deciding that CBM ownership vested in the coal owner).
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congressional intent, the court emphasized that extraction methods did
not exist in 1909 and that CBM, an essential component of coal, was
trapped within coal." Although the court in its decision declined to fol-
low these cases because the Southern Ute case involved a statutory
analysis rather than a common law analysis, the court relied on these
cases in its rehearing en banc and appropriately focused more on the
physical properties and difficult extraction methods of CBM as justifica-
tion for its holding that the coal owner also owned the CBM contained
within the coal.",
Although the Tenth Circuit took a positive step toward resolving the
CBM ownership issue, legal uncertainty still remains because the deci-
sion is highly fact specific and will only be applicable in situations in-
volving the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910.0 Lawyers and regulatory
agencies will continue to struggle with the problematic application of
existing oil and gas laws to CBM ownership, exploration, extraction, and
production."' Due to varying physical conditions, oil and gas statutes do
not apply to CBM, magnifying the need for specific regulation of CBM
ownership through legislation. 7
III. ROYALTY PAYMENTS FROM SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS
A. Background
During the 1970s and 1980s, gas purchasers frequently entered into
long-term contracts including "take-or-pay" clauses with gas producers."
These clauses gave gas purchasers two options. The gas purchaser could
take a specific quantity of gas at the maximum lawful price during each
contract year,"° or the gas purchaser could also make one annual payment
to the gas producer if the quantity of gas taken fell below the minimum
103. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.2d at 823. The court stated:
It is not reasonable to impute to Congress a desire to retain only solid rock coal con-
stituents and to convey gaseous coal constituents when CBM is an integral component
of coal and in 1909 there appears to have been no technology by which a patent holder
could extract CBM from coal without damaging or destroying the coal.
Id.
104. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 94-1759, 1998 WL 404549, at *8-9
(I 0th Cir. July 20, 1998). Cf. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 119 F.3d at 828 n. 17.
105. Leeds, supra note 18, at 500.
106. Cohen, supra note 15, at 15.
107. Id. at 15-16. Oil and gas conservation statutes prevent the loss of "oil and gas by ineffi-
cient production." Id. at 17. However, CBM, will not be lost if owners do not compete for it, because
it must be stimulated before it can be removed. Id.
108. Beverly M. Barrett, Note, Oil and Gas: Roye Realty v. Watson: Are Royalties Owed on all
Take-or-Pay Settlements in Oklahoma?, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 745,745 (1993).
109. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1988). Take-
or-pay clauses required the gas purchaser to make minimum payments even if no gas was taken.
Barrett, supra note 108, at 745.
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annual contractual quantity.' ° Take-or-pay clauses "apportion the risks of
natural gas production and sales between the buyer and seller."" Since
the gas producer bore the risk of production, the gas purchaser compen-
sated by agreeing to take a minimum quantity of gas."2 Gas pipelines, as
purchasers, also benefited from take-or-pay contracts."3
During the energy crisis of the 1970s, take-or-pay payments became
substitutes for price competition."" Severe gas shortages compelled Con-
gress to enact the National Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), which re-
quired the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to regulate gas
through classifications."5 When the NGPA prevented gas producers from
competing for prices, gas producers turned to take-or-pay clauses for
protection against demand fluctuations."6 The percentage of contracts
containing take-or-pay clauses increased from twenty-five percent in the
early 1970s to as much as ninety percent at the apex of the gas market. 7
When gas demand declined in the 1980s, gas purchasers found them-
selves saddled with enormous take-or-pay liabilities, frequently greater
than their net worth."' Purchasers defaulted on their take-or-pay agree-
ments, spurring enormous amounts of litigation." 9 Purchasers' potential
110. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co., 853 F.2d at 1164. The gas purchaser can also take
the oil or gas already paid for in the following years. Charles E. Harrell et al., Securitization of Oil,
Gas, and Other Natural Resource Assets: Emerging Financing Techniques, 52 Bus. LAW. 885, 894
n.30 (1997).
111. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co., 853 F.2d at 1167 (citing Universal Resources Corp.
v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 813 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1987)).
112. Id. "[Tiake-or-pay payments are payments for the pipeline-purchaser's failure to purchase
(take) gas." Id. (citing Pennzoil Co. v. State, No. 104-35 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 20, 1986), affd, State
v. Pennzoil, 752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1995)).
113. See Angela Jeanne Crowder, Comment, Take-or-Pay Payments and Settlements--Does the
Landowner Share?, 49 LA. L. REV. 921, 922 (1989) ("Since gas cannot be stored, the pipelines
could now take only the amounts needed and, rather than face breaching the contracts when the
market demand was low, simply pay for the remaining amounts not taken.").
114. See Lowe, supra note 14, at 263 n.269 ("[In the 1970s ... pipeline companies used high
take-or-pay commitments as substitutes for price competition, which was barred by the federal gas
regulatory scheme."); Joseph P. Tomain, Energy Policy Advice for the New Administration, 46
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 73-74 (1989) (discussing how the effects of the oil embargo, regulation,
and gas shortages in the mid-1970s encouraged oil producers and purchasers to enter into take-or-
pay contracts).
115. Pierce, supra note 7, at 54. The categories pertain to "certain characteristics of gas sup-
plies and the costs of producing those supplies," which FERC used to determine price ceilings.
Pierce, supra note 12, at 348.
116. Lowe, supra note 14, at 227; see also Pierce, supra note 7, at 55.
117. See Lowe, supra note 14, at 227. FERC estimated that gas purchasers' take-or-pay agree-
ments accrued between $7 and $10 billion by 1984. William H. White, The Right to Recover Royal-
ties on Natural Gas Take-or-Pay Settlements, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 663, 664 (1988).
118. Lowe, supra note 14, at 227. Pipelines suffered losses in the form of "payments for gas not
taken, above-market payments for gas that was taken, or payments to settle contract disputes." J.
Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1122 (1997).
119. Lowe, supra note 14, at 227 ("When gas demand ... declined sharply in the early 1980s,
the gas boom became a litigation boom as gas pipelines defaulted on their take-or-pay obligations..
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liability ranged from sixty to seventy billion dollars and settlement costs
ranged from twelve to fifteen billion dollars.'2" The lawsuits and settle-
ments between gas producers and purchasers sparked a new surge of
litigation over whether royalty owners were entitled to a share of the
producers' settlement awards.'2'
Most jurisdictions do not allow royalties for take-or-pay payments
or settlements unless the payment is for gas actually produced. The Fifth
Circuit in Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel'22 held that roy-
alties were not due on take-or-pay payments, reasoning that no gas was
produced at the time a payment was made.'" Royalties are due only when
gas was produced, and production means "the actual physical severance
of minerals from the formation."'2
A minority of jurisdictions apply the "cooperative venture" theory,
allowing royalties for take-or-pay payments even without the actual pro-
duction of gas.'" In Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 6 the Louisiana Su-
preme Court applied the cooperative venture analysis.' v The court looked
at the general intent of the parties when entering into the lease, equitable
principles, and economic realities of the industry. If the lease was silent
. ."). Some take-or-pay agreements allow for time to "make up" the gas not taken. White, supra note
117, at 663. However, if the purchaser does not take the gas within the scheduled "make up" period,
the purchaser may be liable to the seller for the costs. Id.
120. Lowe, supra note 14, at 227. FERC promoted settlements by encouraging producers to
offer credits against take-or-pay claims. John S. Lowe, Current Lease and Royalty Problems in the
Gas Industry, 23 TULSA L.J. 547, 560-61 (1988) [hereinafter Lowe, Current Lease].
121. White, supra note 117, at 663-64. A royalty is the "landowner's share of production, free
of expenses of production." Richard F. Brown, Oil, Gas and Mineral Law, 50 SMU L. REV. 1371,
1376 (1997). As one commentator stated, "royalty owners are increasingly more sophisticated and
cognizant of their rights and lately have become much more litigious." Si M. Bondurant, Royalty
Owner Rights Under Division Orders, 25 TULSA L.J. 571, 571 (1990). Another commentator sug-
gests that courts usually do not experience problems with enforcing the terms of take-or-pay con-
tracts as a matter of law. John Burritt McArthur, A Twelve-Step Program fbr COPAS to Strengthen
Oil and Gas Accounting Protections, 49 SMU L. REV. 1447, 1455 n.9 (1996).
122. 853 F.2d 1159(5th Cir. 1988).
123. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1164. The court held that the value of production is
indeterminable until gas is taken. Id. at 1166-67.
124. Id. at 1168. "Production requires severance of the mineral from the ground." State v.
Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 979 (Wyo. 1988).
125. See Ban-ett, supra note 108, at 750-52. A "cooperative venture" requires the lessor to
contribute the land and the lessee to contribute the expertise and capital to develop minerals for the
parties mutual benefit. Crowder, supra note 113, at 928-29. The lease is merely a "bargained-for
exchange." Patricia A. Brown, Klein v. Jones: Equitable Right to Royalties on Take-or-Pay Settle-
ments, 47 ARK. L. REV. 749, 775 (1994). The cooperative venture theory is an extension of the
"Harrell rule," which characterizes a gas lease as a mutually beneficial relationship between lessor
and lessee. Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1996). Professor Thomas
Harrell coined the terms "Harrell rule" and "cooperative venture." Lowe, supra note 14, at 241-42.
126. 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992).
127. Frey, 603 So. 2d at 173. The court's use of the cooperative venture theory was based on
unusual state statutes that could be interpreted to expand royalty obligations based on unjust enrich-
ment. Lowe, supra note 14, at 257.
128. See Brown, supra note 125, at 772-73; Lowe, supra note 14, at 240-41; Barrett, supra note
108, at 750-5 1.
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on the production of gas as a prerequisite to royalty payments on take-or-
pay agreements, the court did not require actual production if such an
intent could not be found in the lease negotiations or related extrinsic
docum ents.'" Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court's rationale, the Tenth
Circuit declined to apply the cooperative venture approach and required
the actual production of gas for royalties on take-or-pay payments."
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell3.
a. Facts
The New Mexico State Land Office issued oil and gas leases in state
lands held in trust for various beneficiaries, including educational insti-
tutions.'32 Harvey E. Yates Co. (HEYCO) produced natural gas under
many of these leases.'33 HEYCO entered thirty-five gas supply contracts
with two pipeline companies, El Paso Natural Gas Company and Trans-
western Pipeline Company."'3 The contracts included take-or-pay clauses
which later became impractical as the natural gas market price dropped.'3"
HEYCO settled with the two pipeline companies, but failed to pay the
state royalties for settlement payments as required by New Mexico law.'36
However, HEYCO did pay royalties on gas produced after the settle-
ments.
HEYCO and the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association (NMOGA)
filed a declaratory judgment action in district court against the Commis-
sioner of Public Lands (Commissioner) to invalidate a New Mexico State
Land Office regulation governing royalty payments and calculations for
oil and gas leases.' 8 The Commissioner filed a counterclaim in federal
district court for royalty payments and damages based on HEYCO's set-
tlements.' 9 The court granted summary judgment for HEYCO on all of
the Commissioner's counterclaims, determining that royalty payments
129. See Lowe, supra note 14, at 240-41.
130. Harvey E. Yates Co. v. Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1996).
131. 98F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996).
132. , Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d at 1226.
133. Id. at 1227.
134. Id. Thirty-three of these contracts were with the El Paso Natural Gas Company and two
with the Transwestern Pipeline Company. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1227-28.
137. Id. For example, HEYCO paid royalties to the state on gas produced at lower spot market
prices following the Transwestern settlement. Id.
138. Id. at 1226. The case refers to the regulation as "Rule 1.059." Id.
139. Id.
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were not due on the settlement proceeds.'" The Commissioner
appealed.
141
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the summary judgment in favor of
HEYCO."2 First, the court addressed whether HEYCO breached its duty
to pay the state royalties on the settlement proceeds."" Under the plain
meaning of the New Mexico statute governing oil and gas leases, the
court determined that the lessee was only obligated to pay royalties on
gas actually produced.'"
The court developed a three-part framework to determine whether
royalties are due on cash settlement payments from the various types of
leases containing take-or-pay clauses." First, the gas must be physically
extracted from the ground before royalty payments are due on a produc-
tion-type lease." Second, cash settlements for a take-or-pay lease con-
tract are not royalty-bearing.'"4 Third, the lessee must pay the lessor roy-
alties on a buy-down portion of a settlement payment that is a buy-down
of the contract price for gas at the time of production.'"
The court used this framework to reject the Commissioner's argu-
ment that the lease should be broadly construed with emphasis placed on
the intent of the parties when entering into the lease contract. 9 The court
also rejected the Commissioner's reliance on cases applying the "coop-
erative venture" approach to require royalty payments on take-or-pay
settlement proceeds." Unlike the cases on which the Commissioner re-
lied, the New Mexico statute did not broadly define royalty payments
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1241.
143. Id. at 1229. "Although the terms of the New Mexico oil and gas lease are prescribed by
statute, the lease itself is a contract between the State as lessor on the one hand and HEYCO as
lessee on the other." Id. at 1229-30.
144. Id. at 1230. The statute states:
Subject to the free use without royalty, as hereinbefore provided, at the option of the les-
sor at any time and from time to time, the lessee shall pay the lessor as royalty one-eighth
part of the gas produced and saved from the leased premises, including casing-head gas.
Unless said option is exercised by lessor, the lessee shall pay the lessor as royalty one-
eighth of the cash value of the gas, including casing-head gas, produced and saved from
the leased premises and marketed or utilized, such value to be equal to the net proceeds
derived from the sale of such gas in the field ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-10-4.1 (Michie 1978 and Repl. 1994).
145. Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d at 1231 (citing Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Ref. Co., 822
S.W.2d 153, 164 (rex. Ct. App. 1991); Killam Oil Co. v. Bnni, 806 S.W.2d 264,268 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The amount must reflect a "fair apportionment of the price adjustment payment over
the purchases affected by such price adjustment." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1231-32.
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and specifically linked royalty payments with gas production. 5 ' The
court concluded that HEYCO did not owe royalty payments to the state
unless gas was actually produced.'
Next, the court addressed whether HEYCO's settlement proceeds
from El Paso and Transwestem were paid for gas production.' 3 The
payment of royalties depended on whether the proceeds were ascribed to
take-or-pay deficiencies based on non-production or whether the pro-
ceeds were ascribed to price adjustments to be obtained in the future.'-'
The court believed a genuine issue of material fact existed because the
record was unclear and, therefore, remanded the case to the district
court.'5"
2. Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co."
a. Facts
Several lessors of oil and gas interests (Lessors) sued Atlantic Rich-
field Company (ARCO) for failure to pay royalties on settlement pro-
ceeds.' 7 ARCO received $300 million in recoupable payments from a
settlement with a gas pipeline purchaser.'58 ARCO paid the lessors royal-
ties on gas produced but not from the settlement proceeds.' The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of ARCO, reasoning that
ARCO's lease did not include royalty payments for settlement proceeds
and the proceeds were not attributable to gas production.'"
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed ARCO's duty to pay royalties.'6 ' These
"production-type" leases only required royalty payments when gas was
151. Id. at 1233 (discussing the fact that under New Mexico state law, royalties are specifically
linked to gas which is produced on the leased premises). The cases cited by the Commissioner, Frey
v. Amoco Production Co., 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992), and Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.
1992), involved constructively different statutes which did not explicitly linkeroyalties to gas pro-
duction. Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d at 1233-34.
152. Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d. at 1234-35.
153. Id. at 1235.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 115 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 1997).
157. Watts, 115 F.3d at 789. Lessors also filed a claim, not discussed in this survey, against
ARCO for failure to obtain the best price available. Id.
158. Id. The gas pipeline producer in this case, Arkla, bought gas from ARCO produced at the
Wharton Field. Id. at 788. Litigation between ARCO and Arkla subsequently arose over Arkla's
refusal to purchase gas produced at the Wharton Field, resulting in the $300 million recoupable
payments. Id. at 788-89.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 788-89, 790.
161. Id.
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actually produced.'62 The court determined that the district court erred in
deciding that royalties were not due because payment of settlement pro-
ceeds were not included in the lease."' The court reasoned that the set-
tlement proceeds must have been expressly excluded from the leases."M
Consequently, settlement proceeds are technically for gas produced and
sold.'"
In addition, the court addressed whether the settlement proceeds
were attributable to actual production."M The court relied on its prior de-
cision in Harvey E. Yates Co. to resolve this issue."' However, a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether the non-cash settlement pro-
ceeds constituted payment for produced gas.'" The court reversed the
grant of summary judgment in favor of ARCO and remanded the issue to
the district court.'
C. Other Circuits
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Century Offshore Management
Corp.'7" faced a similar issue of whether settlement payments were roy-
alty-bearing.'7 ' Century Offshore Management Corp. (Century), a natural
gas producer, leased federally-owned land, subject to royalties.' Century
contracted with Enron for the sale of gas.' 3 Enron paid Century a lump
sum to terminate the contracts containing take-or-pay provisions and
replace them with new contracts.' Century failed to pay the government
royalties on the lump sum payment.'5
The court interpreted Diamond Shamrock to require some nexus
with production and determined that the replacement contracts provided
the necessary nexus between payment and production.' The court rea-
soned that the lump sum payment constituted an advance payment for
162. Id. at 791. "Under the plain terms of these so-called 'production-type' leases, the lessee is
not obligated to pay a royalty on the value of gas in the abstract, but only on the cash value of gas
that is actually produced and sold from the leased property." Id. (citing Harvey E. Yates Co. v.
Powell, 98 F.3d 1222, 1230 (10th Cir. 1996)).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Harvey E. Yates Co., 98 F.3d at 1231).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 790.
168. Id. at 794 ("Although the district court concluded that none of the settlement proceeds
were related to the production of gas, the record does not allow us to rule out such a finding. We,
therefore, reverse... [and] remand to the district court for further proceedings on this question.").
169. Id.
170. 111 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1997).
171. Century, I 11F.3dat443.
172. Id. at 445.
173. Id. at 446.
174. Id. at 447.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 449-50. "Though this gas was not make-up gas, it is analogous to make-up gas in the
sense that though it is paid after the payment at issue, it provides a link to production." Id. at 450.
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production sold; therefore, the lessee must pay royalties on the lump sum
payment when the gas was produced.'"
D. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit has developed into what some commentators call
a "plain terms" jurisdiction.'78 The court will not look at the intent of the
parties or other extrinsic evidence when interpreting a lease.' 79 Instead,
the court will look only at the plain language in the lease without consid-
ering the parties' intent or relationship.'" Therefore, parties should care-
fully draft the lease to incorporate provisions for royalty payments on
take-or-pay payments or settlements.'8'
The Sixth Circuit, like the Tenth Circuit, appears to be a plain terms
jurisdiction requiring gas to be produced before royalties were due.'82
However, the Sixth Circuit seemed to allow a broader interpretation of
production since no gas was actually produced at the time the lump sum
was paid in Century.'
IV. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH OIL LEASES
A. Background
Oil and gas production may interfere with the oil producing capa-
bilities of neighboring mineral leases through the use of water flood
177. Id.
178. See Lowe, supra note 14, at 244. A plain terms jurisdiction defines the royalty obligation
by only looking at the plain terms of the royalty clause. Id. One commentator contends that most
courts will eventually adopt the cooperative venture approach for three reasons. Id. at 251-52. First,
analyzing a lease as a cooperative venture is realistic because the presence, quantity, and production
of minerals is uncertain. Id. at 252. Second, the plain terms of a lease are only helpful in the field,
not to the parties. Id. Third, royalty has historically been payable in kind upon production. Id. at 252-
53.
179. Id. at 244.
180. Id. According to one commentator, royalty owners are more likely to win in cooperative
venture jurisdictions than in plain term jurisdictions. Id. at 254.
181. James E. Prince, Note, Production, Production, What is Production?: Diamond Shamrock
v. Hodel, 1989 BYU L. REV. 1333, 1350. Royalty payments due to lessors depend largely on the
terms of the royalty clause in the oil and gas lease. Arthur J. Wright & Carla J. Sharpe, Direct Gas
Sales: Royalty Problems for the Producer, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 235, 236 (1993). Private lease holders
should draft leases according to their own terms. Id. Parties should negotiate lease terms and ex-
pressly include the negotiation results in the lease. See Crowder, supra note 113, at 929. The parties
should delete any offending clauses. See Bondurant, supra note 121, at 599. The interests of the
lessee and lessor should coincide in the royalty clause, ensuring clarity. David E. Pierce, Incorpo-
rating a Century of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence into the "Modern" Oil and Gas Lease, 33
WASHBURN L.J. 786, 830 (1994).
182. See Century, Ill F.3d at 449.
183. Id.
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projects and the drainage of oil and gas from one lease to another.'" Such
damage to production may constitute a tortious act."5
Lessees engaging in oil production enhancement techniques, such as
subsurface fluid injection and hydraulic fracturing, which damage neigh-
boring production, may be liable under various tort theories, such as sub-
surface trespass and private nuisance.'" A typical injection method in-
volves "pumping salt water (or other fluid) into an injection well as part
of an enhancement recovery operation to 'sweep' hydrocarbons toward
producing wells, thereby recovering reserves incremental to primary
recovery .... ,' Courts have generally held the lessee liable for subsur-
face trespass if the injection operations reduced the adjoining property's
mineral recovery. ' "
Similarly, hydraulic fracturing invokes the same subsurface trespass
claims.'" Hydraulic fracturing pumps viscous fluids into a well bore to
fracture the reservoir rock." The fracture serves as a drain for oil and gas
extraction.'9 ' However a subsurface trespass may result since the size and
direction of the fracture is controlled by the compressive stress of the
rock formation and not the operator."
A lessee also has a duty to protect the leased property against drain-
age.'93 Courts recognize an implied covenant to protect against drainage,
even if the term is not found in the lease.' 8 Courts require the lessee to
184. Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 115 F.3d 785, 795 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing gas drain-
age into surrounding leases); Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing water flood projects); see Pierce, State Regulation, supra note I1, at 20-21.
185. Watts, 115 F.3d at 795.
186. Terry D. Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass, 28 TULSA
L.J. 311,335 (1993).
187. Id. Other methods of fluid injection include "pumping salt water into a well to inexpen-
sively dispose of 'waste' fluids in a salt water formation ... and .. injecting natural gas into an
underground storage reservoir." Id.
188. Id. at 335-36.
189. Id. at 338.
190. Id. at 338. The "fluid is mixed with a proppant and pumped with sufficient pressure into a
well bore" to create the fracture which extends into the producing area. Id.
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. Gerson v. Anderson-Prichard Prod. Corp., 149 F.2d 444, 446 (10th Cir. 1945). Drainage is
defined as the "[m]igration of oil or gas in a reservoir due to a pressure reduction caused by produc-
tion from wells bottomed in the reservoir." Bruce M. Kramer, The Interaction Between the Common
Law Implied Covenants to Prevent Drainage and Market and the Federal Oil and Gas Lease, 15 J.
ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. I, I n.3 (1995). Factors to consider when dealing with
drainage include reservoir location, presence of adjoining wells draining the reservoir, and the
amount of gas the wells lose from drainage. John Burritt McArthur, The Class Action Tool in Oil-
field Litigation, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 113, 180 (1996).
194. See Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases-Past, Present & Future,
33 WASHBURN L.J. 639, 640 (1994) ("While some have contended that implied covenants are im-
plied in fact, candor requires us to acknowledge that implied covenants are judicial creations ....
(Tihe courts require that the lessee conform to some standard of fair dealing with the lessor.").
Courts define implied covenants as "unwritten promises" that originate from oil and gas lease ambi-
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conform to a "reasonably prudent operator" standard.'" A prudent op-
erator's duty includes "the doing of that which an experienced operator
of ordinary prudence should do" on the premises, while having due re-
gard for the interests of both lessor and lessee.'"
To establish a breach of an implied covenant to protect against
drainage, the lessor must first establish that oil or gas has been, or is be-
ing, drained from the lease.'97 Second, the lessor must prove that drilling
an offset well would abate the problem by recovering operating costs and
a reasonable profit.'" The lessee does not bear the burden, however, of an
implied duty to drill an offset well if it would be economically
infeasible.'" Remedies for a breach of a drainage covenant are usually
monetary damages.'
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc."'
a. Facts
Rhodes Field is a common underground oil supply subject to many
leases.' Morsey owned a lease (Section 20) at Rhodes Field.' Chevron
operated a water flood project on neighboring oil leases.' The previous
owners of the Morsey and Chevron leases committed to a cooperative
waterflood project.' The flood project involved the injection of water
guities and the relationship between lessor and lessee. Lowe, Current Lease, supra note 120, at 564.
Some leases include express obligations to protect against drainage. McArthur, supra note 193, at
180.
195. Martin, supra note 194, at 640-41. Courts control the lessee's behavior by imposing this
standard which is analogous to tort law's "reasonable man" standard. Id. at 666.
196. Gerson, 149 F.2d at 446. "Whatever... would be reasonably expected of operators of
ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee, is what is required."
Kramer, supra note 193, at 7 (citing Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801,814 (8th Cir. 1905)).
197. Kramer, supra note 193, at 8-9.
198. Id. at 9.
199. Gerson, 149 F.2d at 446. "No obligation rests upon the lessee to carry the operations
beyond the point where they are profitable to him, even if some benefit to the lessor would result
from them." Id.
200. Kramer, supra note 193, at 11-12. The underlying cause of action is usually a breach of
contract claim. Id. at 11. Royalty owners can also seek class remedies. McArthur, supra note 193, at
180. However, class action drainage claims often fail the numerosity element, because only one or
two wells may be affected, or the commonality element, because the plaintiffs interests may not be
common enough if some lessors benefit while others are hurt by drainage. Id.
201. 94F.3d 1470 (l0th Cir. 1996).
202. Morsey, 94 F.3d at 1473. The Rhodes Field produces oil from the Mississippi formation
4,450 feet underground. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1474.
205. Id. at 1473.
through pipes into the field.' The project recovered otherwise unrecov-
erable oil reserves.'
Morsey claimed that Chevron's flood project "interfered with and
damaged the oil producing capabilities of his oil lease."' When Chevron
used injection pumps, the fluid level of Morsey's wells dropped.' Mor-
sey sued Chevron for temporary and permanent damages, damages in-
flicted on the leasehold prior to his acquisition, and punitive damages" '
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Chevron on all
of Morsey's claims."'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Chevron on Morsey's claims."2 The court noted that
Kansas law gives leaseholders a remedy for wrongful interference with a
lease."' Such interference includes injury to the oil producing ability of
the lease.""
Initially, the court addressed Morsey's request for temporary dam-
ages." ' Temporary damages limit recovery to intermittent and abatable
injuries." 6 Morsey failed to bear the burden of proving that the water
preventing oil production on Section 20 could be remedied, removed, or
abated within a reasonable time.2 ' Morsey's suggestion that the damage
might be abated was insufficient."8 Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chevron on this issue."9
The court also rejected Morsey's argument that his punitive dam-
ages claim should be heard before a jury.2" The court reasoned that since
Morsey failed to prove actual, temporary damages, his claim for punitive
206. Id.
207. Id. The water pumped into the field raised the pressure in the field forcing out reserves
otherwise unrecoverable. See id.
208. Id. at 1474.
209. Id. Furthermore, it was determined that water from the Rhodes Unit was being communi-
cated to the Morsey lease. Id.
210. Id. Morsey claimed that his predecessors-in-interest assigned all fights to him; therefore,
he was entitled to recover damages that occurred prior to his acquisition of the leasehold. Id.
211. Id. at 1474-75.
212. Id. at 1477-78.
213. Id. at 1475. "[A] leaseholder is entitled to a remedy for wrongful interference with his or
her interest in the leasehold." Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1476 (citing McAlister v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 662 P.2d 1203, 1212 (Kan. 1983)).
217. Id. at 1476-77. The court stated that the possibility that the condition could reasonably be
remedied, removed or abated was insufficient for proving temporary damages. Id. ("[P]roof of
temporary damages requires more.").
218. Id. "Possibilities are not proof, and ... speculation and conjecture are no substitute for
evidence." Id. at 1477.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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damages also failed."' The court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Chevron.'
Finally, the court addressed Morsey's claim that his acquisition of
the lease included his predecessors' right to sue for past injuries.' Kan-
sas law prohibits assignment of this type of tort claim." ' Damages to the
leasehold prior to Morsey's acquisition belonged to his predecessors-in-
interest and expired when the lease was transferred to Morsey. ' Thus,
the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against
Morsey on this claim."
2. Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co."'
a. Facts
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission issued Field Rules recog-
nizing the Arbuckle Formation as a common gas supply.' The Field
Rules specified monthly "allowables" limiting production at each unit. '
The Field Rules were designed to make sure each well produced only its
fair share.'m Whenever a well underproduced its allowable amount (un-
derage), the Field Rules allowed the underage to be carried over into the
next month."' The underages would be cancelled after exceeding a speci-
fied limit.
Several of Atlantic Richfield Company's (ARCO) wells accumu-
lated underages approaching cancellation levels.23 To make up for the
underages and satisfy the Field Rules' allowable requirement, ARCO
began workover operations which increased production in these wells.24
Lessors, who owned neighboring leases, maintained that the workovers
drained gas from their wells, resulting in decreased gas production. '
Lessors sued ARCO for uncompensated drainage, but the district court
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1478.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 115 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 1997).
228. Watts, 115 F.3d at 789. "[A]ny one well could ultimately drain all the gas in the forma-
tion." id.
229. Id. "Allowables" are limits on the monthly production of gas for each unit of wells at the
Arbuckle Formation. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. The accumulated underage increased the limit on future production. Id.
232. Id. The Field Rules included an "Effective Date" which gave the Unit Operator from May
I, 1990, to December 31, 1991, to adjust any under and over production before the amounts were
subject to cancellation. Id.
233. Id. at 789-90.
234. Id. at 790.
235. Id.
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granted summary judgment in favor of ARCO because the Field Rules
barred Lessors' claims.2
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of ARCO.f' Under Oklahoma law, oil and gas leases
contain an implied covenant to develop a lease as a prudent operator by
protecting against drainage, and failing to do so may constitute a tortious
act ."' The court rejected the district court's reasoning that the Field Rules
excused ARCO from liability and found that nothing in the Field Rules
prevented ARCO from protecting against drainage."
C. Analysis
Some commentators assert that courts are usually unwilling to as-
sess liability due to strong public policy in favor of promoting enhanced
oil and gas production.2" Similarly, the Tenth Circuit appeared to favor
production over the rights of neighboring lease owners, like Morsey"
Morsey bore the burden of proving that Chevron could have remedied
the damage resulting from the water flood project, leaving no room for
the mere possibility of abatement.42 The Tenth Circuit will not penalize
oil producers and hinder production even if the plaintiff shows that dam-
age abatement is probable. This reasoning promotes enhanced oil and gas
production.4 Consequently, the individual lease owner will not prevail
against the oil and gas company even if the lease owner's property is
damaged."
The Tenth Circuit in Watts further promoted oil and gas production
by protecting leases from drainage.2 '5 The Tenth Circuit is willing to im-
ply a covenant to protect against drainage despite the absence of local
laws to the contrary.2' Therefore, a lessee who is draining oil or gas from
a neighboring lease will be exposed to potential liability.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 796.
238. Id. (citing Morriss v. Barton, 190 P.2d 451, 457 (Okla. 1947)).
239. Id. at 796.
240. See Ragsdale, supra note 186, at 335 (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d
560, 568 (Tex. 1962)).
241. Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 1470, 1476 (10th Cir. 1996).
242. See id. at 1476-77 ("[P]roof of temporary damages requires more.').
243. See Ragsdale, supra note 186, at 335.
244. See id.
245. See Watts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 115 F.3d 785, 796 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that the
Atlantic Richfield Company is required to comply with its implied duty to protect against drainage).
246. Id. at 795.
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CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit addressed a very controversial issue regarding
CBM ownership and attempted to clarify ambiguities in the statutory
language used to identify coal and CBM ownership rights. The issue will
remain uncertain, however, until Congress passes specific legislation
governing CBM. In contrast, the court did not deviate from the estab-
lished law governing royalty payments of settlement proceeds and tor-
tious interference with oil and gas leases.
Miranda K. Peterson
